Below, I’ve listed some of my ongoing research papers. If you’d like to access the latest versions of any of these papers or have any questions or comments, please don’t hesitate to reach out to me.
Cleavage Crystallisation at the Micro Level: Radical-Right Support and Globalization-Loser Identity
Matthias Mader & Nils D. Steiner
Abstract: European party systems are increasingly organized around an emerging cleavage between universalist and particularist political forces. Dynamic accounts of cleavage formation suggest that such divides crystallize through a recursive process in which collective identities and partisan alignments stabilize one another over time. Yet this individual-level dynamic has rarely been observed empirically. We test it at the particularist pole, focusing on self-categorization as a globalization loser as an electorally consequential identity. Drawing on six waves of the German Longitudinal Election Study (2018–2023), we estimate cross-lagged panel models linking globalization-loser identity to support for the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Both directions are present in the data: loser self-categorizations predict stronger subsequent AfD support, and AfD support predicts a higher subsequent tendency to self-categorize as a loser of globalization. By bringing cleavage theory into dialogue with research on party cueing and identity entrepreneurship, the paper offers both an explicit account of the recursive micro-level mechanism of cleavage crystallization and direct longitudinal evidence on it.
A Widening Education Gap in Satisfaction with Democracy? An Age-Period-Cohort Analysis of Western Europe
Armin Schäfer & Nils D. Steiner
Abstract: The rise of radical right parties in Western democracies has been linked to growing political divides along educational lines. While voting differences by education are well-documented, less is known about evolving gaps in satisfaction with democracy that may underlie these trends. This study hypothesises a widening divide in democratic satisfaction between higher and lower educated citizens, driven by unequal gains from the knowledge economy and disparities in representation. We argue that this gap may grow gradually or through generational replacement. Using age-period-cohort analyses on Eurobarometer (EB) data (1973–2024) and the European Social Survey (ESS) (2002–2022), we find broad support for the expectation of a widening educational divide. Yet, while the EB results primarily suggest a gradual widening over time, the ESS data point to larger gaps among more recent cohorts—likely reflecting their differing time spans. Finally, dissatisfaction with democracy predicts voting for radical right parties in the ESS data, and most strongly so among the lower educated in more recent cohorts. These findings suggest that the success of radical right parties is partly fueled by a growing education divide in democratic satisfaction.
Framing Democratic Discontent: Information about Collective Dissatisfaction Reduces Individual Satisfaction with Democracy
Sven Hillen & Nils D. Steiner
Abstract: While the drivers of satisfaction with democracy are widely studied, we know little about the role of perceptions of collective sentiment. Building on research on bandwagon effects, we argue that citizens adjust their evaluations of democracy in light of information about what others think. We test this argument in a preregistered survey experiment in Germany that presented information derived from the same underlying data on public democratic satisfaction, framed in either a negative, positive, or neutral way. Respondents exposed to the negative framing report lower satisfaction with democracy and lower political trust, whereas the positive framing does not meaningfully increase satisfaction. These findings indicate a negativity bias in how citizens respond to information about collective sentiment: signals of widespread dissatisfaction are more influential than equivalent positive cues. The study highlights the social construction of democratic satisfaction and suggests that narratives of democratic discontent may become partly self-fulfilling.
Beliefs About Public Opinion and the Perceived Legitimacy of Policy Decisions
Nils D. Steiner & Claudia Landwehr
Abstract: Democratic legitimacy is often thought to rest on citizens’ sense that political decisions reflect the public’s preferences. Yet citizens’ beliefs about public opinion are frequently inaccurate and shaped by false consensus—the tendency to project one’s own views onto others. We investigate how beliefs about public opinion affect the legitimacy citizens attribute to adopting policy proposals, and whether correcting these beliefs changes legitimacy judgments. In our representative survey from Germany, respondents reported their own positions on several policies, estimated public support for those, and evaluated the legitimacy of adopting them. An embedded information experiment provided participants with actual opinion poll data on the policies. We find that legitimacy evaluations reflect not only respondents’ own preferences but also perceived public support, and that experimentally supplied poll information shifts legitimacy judgments in the expected direction: learning that a proposal lacks public backing lowers perceived legitimacy, particularly among those who had overestimated support. However, these information effects are modest and heterogeneous—varying across issues and appearing stronger among politically engaged respondents and those who view polls as informative. The findings highlight the conditional role of public-opinion (mis-)perceptions in citizens’ reasoning about democratic legitimacy.
Income Inequality and Populist Attitudes: Evidence from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems V
Nils D. Steiner
Abstract: Economic inequality is one of the factors discussed as a potential driver of the success of populist parties. One plausible underlying mechanism is that economic inequality increases populist sentiment among voters, which in turn leads to higher support for populist parties. Yet, we lack evidence on whether populist attitudes are more widespread where economic inequality is higher. In this study, I use data from the 5th Module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)—the first large cross-national survey dataset containing a measure of populist attitudes—to contribute such evidence. The analysis uncovers a substantively strong and robust positive cross-country correlation between income inequality and populist attitudes. Yet contrary to expectations, economic inequality does not make a larger difference for populist attitudes among those with lower socio-economic status. These findings add to evidence pointing to a connection between inequality and populism, but suggest that higher inequality contexts provide conditions conducive to populist sentiment among broad segments of the population.